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4
Karl's Law School, or The Oven Bird in Buffalo
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY

The idea for my reflection on "The Oven Bird's Song" originated in a
conversation I had with David Engel almost thirty years after the publication
of his article. When I was cleaning out my office files in anticipation of
retirement, I discovered copies of David's first two drafts of the article, versions
that had yet to incorporate - in title or text - the Robert Frost poem. I walked
down the hall to David's office and presented these early drafts to him. He
seemed very pleased to see, once again, the evidence of his preliminary work,
and said "You remember this was my job talk when I interviewed here," to
which I responded: "I know, we hired you anyway." And it was in the midst
of our laughter at that moment that a conference and this volume of essays
were born. .
My task is to focus locally rather than globally and to try to situate David
Engel and "The Oven Bird's Song"' within the intellectual life and context
of the Buffalo Law School. In order to do that, we need to know a little about
the institution that David joined in 1981, so that we might better understand
both what brought David and "The Oven Bird" here and why the law school
welcomed the addition of David and his intellectual project at that moment.
To take the full measure of my assignment, I think we have to go back a
little further in time and ask how the Buffalo Law School became the Buffalo
Law School of the 1970s and '8os, and in order to do that, I believe we have

University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor Emeritus, SUNY Buffalo Law School, The State
University of New York. I am very grateful for the valuable comments on versions of this essay
offered by Samantha Barbas, Anya Bernstein, Michael Boucai, David Engel, Patrick Long, Lynn
Mather, Frank Munger, John Henry Schlegel, Robert Steinfeld, Matthew Steilen, Barry Sullivan,
and Winnifred Sullivan. All usual, Dianne Avery contributed exceptional editorial and substantive
suggestions. The standard disclaimer as to final responsibility applies.
1
David M. Engel, "The oven bird's song: insiders, outsiders, and personal injuries in an
American community," Law 6 Society Review, 18 (1984), 551.
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to ask disarmingly simple questions: What do we want a law school to be,
or what do we want out of a law school; and in a related sense, what do we
want law to be, or what do we want out of law? David's journey and Buffalo's
journey were very dependent on the answers to these questions, and in an
attempt to answer them I think we have to recur to the early twentieth-century
origins of an alternative vision of what legal education and legal scholarship
might be, as distinct from the traditional Langdellian wisdom of the case
method, the casebook, and its emphasis on rules, principles, and legal doc
trine.' There is no legal doctrine in "The OvenBird's Song," so why tolerate it
in a law school at this time and in this place? The answer, I believe, can be
traced to the influence of a singular figure in American legal education,
writing at the outset of the Legal Realist movement: Karl Llewellyn.3 In a
sense, along with a handful of other law schools (Wisconsin included), Buffalo
became Karl's law school- a law 'school in which "The Oven Bird's Song"
seemed a nat~ral outgrowth of what legal study should aspire to or become.
We now take it for granted (it's almost a cliche) that one way or the other we
are all legal realists (or "new" legal realists),4 but how we got there can be
found in part in Llewellyn's tearing away the mask of legal education about
100 years ago, and I want to sample briefly some of his observations and
criticisms of law schools and explore why "The Oven Bird's Song" can be
seen as a fulfillment of Llewellyn's promise of a new age of legal education.
Over the course of his life, Llewellyn had lots to say about legal education,
I
and he was not always consistent. He sometimes changed his mind; for
instance, at times he defended the case method and found it useful in a
modified form while at others he was intensely critical of it, particularly when
reflecting on it as the Great Depression in the 1930s stripped away its pre
tenses.5 Yet, over time, for all his withering criticism (he complained of
the "critical aloofness" of law schools and described them as "blind, inept,
factory-ridden, wasteful, defective, and empty. If you prefer verbs: it blinds,

" For an analysis of Christopher Columbus Langdell's impact on legal education as the late
nineteenth-century Dean of the Harvard Law School, see Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of
Modem Professional Education: C. C. Langdel/, 18::z6-1go6 (University of North Carolina
Press, 2009), and Daniel R. Coquillette and Bruce A. Kimball, On the Battlefield of Merit:
Ha111ard Law School, The First Century 304-83 (Harvard University Press, 2015).
3 See generally William L. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (University of
Oklahoma Press, 1985).
4 See, for example, Stewart Macaulay, "Th~ new versus the old legal realism: 'things ain't what
they used to be,"' Wisconsin Law Review, zoos (zoos).
5 Twining, Karl Llewellyn, 132--5, 232-9; Anders Walker, "Bramble Bush revisited: Llewellyn, the
Great Depression and the first law school crisis, 192c;-1939·" Journal of Legal Education, 64
(zo4 ), 161-2, 16 5-6, 171-2.
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it stumbles, it conveyor-belts, it wastes, it mutilates, and it empties"), 6 he began
to formulate a transformational vision of what legal education could be. He
wanted to know what lawyers did because he wanted to prepare law students
for the rigors of practice in an economically threatening time, and he thought
law schools were failing miserably at their job. His _idea was that theory could
be practical, that is, understanding how things worked would be a very good
thing for a law student to grasp in the real world, and simply focusing on legal
rules and doctrines did students a disservice. And though he could be very
practical, shrewd, hardheaded, and analytical, and was incredibly fluent in
legal doctrine, Llewellyn, like many theorists of education, viewed education
as primarily a moral enterprise. In The Bramble Bush, his series of lectures
published in 1930 for entering law students (Lord knows what they made of it,
let alone whether they truly were prepared to understand it), in a chapter
called "Law and Civilization," he observed:
By and large the basic order in our society, and for that matter ·in any
society, is not produced by law. And one of the most misleading claims
that has ever been put forward for law's contribution to civilization is the
notion that it is law from which the basic order flows. The basic order grows,
I repeat, not from law, but (at least every generaHon) from the process of
education. With that process law may have much to do. But the much is
not too much.?
Therefore, in Llewellyn's eyes, education was a moral imperative,8 and
his anger at the perceived failure of legal education was drawn from his belief
that law schools were failing society and also failing law students in their
preparation to serve society. "I think it is to law that we owe the conception
of justice," he remarked.
I am not wholly sure of this. There is a very remote chance that the matter
runs the other way, that we owe law to the concept of justice. There is a
greater chance that both are shoots of the same root. Still, I think law as a
discipline may claim the concept. It should, if it can, for the concept marks
a noble achievement.9

6

K(arl] N. Llewellyn, "On what is wrong with so-called legal education," Columbia Law
Review, 35 (1935), 651, 652-3.
7 There are a number of editions of The Bramble Bush. I have chosen the most recent, which
also has the virtue of having a perceptive introductory essay by Stewart Macaulay. Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 116 (Quid Pro Books, 2012).
8 In this regard, see Philip W.
Jackson, What Is Education? (University of Chicago Press, 2012),
pp. 20,949 Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, 124-
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Having been charged with the responsibility for the concept of justice, law
schools were in danger of abandoning their duty. What was to be done to
prepare students to serve their society and assist law in attaining justice?
In a trenchant little essay entitled "On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal
Education," published in 1935 in the Columbia Law Review, 10 Llewellyn
engaged in a wholesale assault on the form and substance of legal educa
tion, and offered proposals for remedying its evils." Unlike The Bramble Bush,
which sought to explain and defend the process of legal education, this 1935
article sought to demolish the apparatus that had been established since 1870.
The moral edginess was still present: "Ideals without technique are a mess,"
he memorably observed, "[b]ut technique without ideals is a menace. 1112
Social change, however, was taking place right under the very noses of law
schools, and they had better adjust or perish. The nature of practice was
shifting and the standard modes of education were going to be inadequate
to face this brave new world. What was to be done? He had a number of
suggestions: "The need is," he said, "in some fashion, for an integration of the
human and the artistic with the legal. Not an addition merely; an integra
tion.1113 How was that to be accomplished?
As Anders Walker has recently pointed out, Llewellyn, reacting to the
impact of the Great Depression, "did not target interdisciplinary scholarship"
as frivolous or useless, though he had once in the not too distant past been
an avid defender of the case method. "While some reformers called for an
increased attention to clinical.work and practical skills, Llewellyn joined a
cadre of pro-New Deal law teachers who advocated interdisciplinary, policy
centered coursework.~' 14 Ironically, in the face of economic crisis and dimin
ishing job prospects, "Llewellyn did not," Walker observes, "view a more
interdisciplinary focus to be less practical."15 What was the point of intro
ducing a wider lens into traditional legal study? It was to set legal rules
and disputes into context. Llewellyn argued in his 1935 Columbia essay that
"to set rules into their social context, into the context of how men do things,
and of what difference the rule makes to those men - this is to give body to
a rule for any student. It has graphic value, it has movement value, it has
memory value."' 6 According to Llewellyn, "[t]he fact is that legal rules mean,

10

Llewellyn, "On what is wrong."
Incidentally, though Llewellyn's essay originated as a speech at Harvard, the Harvard Law
Review refused to publish it, causing him to comment archly that "their editor's canons of taste
and policy did not jibe with mine." Ibid, 651•.
1
1
15
4
> Ibid, 662.
3 Ibid, 663.
Walker, "Bramble Bush revisited," 178.
Ibid, 166.
6
' Llewellyn, "On what is wrong,"66<].
11
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of themselves, next to nothing."' 7 When you introduce social context, instead,
"[y]ou also make critique of the rule take on its human content. You make
critique inevitable, because the human content, once introduced, will never
be denied."' 8 So, he asserted, it was time to "integrate the background of social
and economic fact and policy, course by course, or fail of our job."'9 And he
called for "wak[ing] faculty-members up to the job of integrating background
social or philosophical - into every course." 20 "The professor's job lies,". he
said, in preparing "the fact-background necessary to give to a policy-inquiry
interest; to a rule, meaningfulness; to a counseling-question, body; to a critical
evaluation, hands and feet." 2 ' In a talk at Duke Law School a year later,
Llewellyn doubled down on his insights, commenting: "I think the most
lamentable thing about American legal education is it has taken into account
neither the society in which the job must be performed nor what we are
educating for.' 122 He suggested that "one of the things that goes to make
lawyers is to make the law a cultural study. That is, curiously, today the most
practical way to train for the trade," 2 3 and he called for "the development of a
realistic sense on the basis of fact.'' 24
We have some sense of what Llewellyn meant by-all of this in action, not
simply in the classroom. An insight into his method and commitment to
context is found not just in his prolific writing, but also in a recently
discovered episode involving the NMCP. In 1933, after a post-Scottsboro
lynching in Alabama, the NMCP submitted a brief to the Justice Department
urging federal prosecution of the local sheriff, under an existing civil rights
statute, for allowing or facilitating the lynching. When the brief was submitted
and published, it included a foreword written by Llewellyn. 2 5 In searing
language, he argued:

.

The enclosed brief is a product of a situation. Behind the cold points of law
is a crying need of fact. Pages (31) to (41) will bum like acid in any unsus
pecting reader's mind. Lynching is now being used, deliberately, to "teach"
Negroes that outside organizations must not be permitted to defend them
in court, though they be on trial for their lives. It is no longer a question
of the individual defendants. Nor is it a question of the crime of which
20
19
21
' 7 Ibid.
' 8 Ibid.
Ibid, 671.
Ibid.
Ibid, 678.
"" Karl N. Llewellyn, "On the why of American legal education," Duke Bar Association Journal,
4 (1936), '9·
2
3 Ibid, 24·
"4 Ibid.
' 5 The account of this episode and its relationship to legal realism may be found in Alfred
L. Brophy, "'Cold legal points into points of flame': Karl Llewellyn attacks lynching" (June 17,
2015), UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2619895, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2619895 or http://dx.doi.orgllo.2139/ssrn.2619895·
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the individual happens to be accused. It is, for the lynchers, a question of
covering institutions as they are against implicit challenge even in the courts
of law. "Keep this case from being another Scottsboro Case" - by driving the
defendants' legal counsel out of town; and then by lynching the defendants.

With offzcial connivance.
It is against this background that the story of the Tuscaloosa lynching, on
pp. (8)-(13), is to be read. It is this background that turns cold legal points
into points of flame. The brief makes clear that the Federal Government
has power to intervene. The brief makes clear that it is the duty of Federal
officials to take action. When the baser elements of Southern communities
turn, not in sudden passion, but as a policy, against the law, when even the
decent elements of the same communities can "understand'' such happen
ings (pp. (39)-(41)), the time has come for intervention of a stronger power.
The statutes have provided for that intervention. Will the Government act?26

"(C]old legal points into points of flame"; "cold points of law" in "crying
need of fact." Here on display are the elements and language of the legal
realist agenda generally and, in particular, its link to Llewellyn's critique of
legal education. Facts, situations (think situation sense and the Uniform
Commercial Code 27), background, communities, understanding - all in a
piece of appellate advocacy.
What does all of this have to do with David Engel, "The Oven Bird," and
the Buffalo Law School? David arrived in Buffalo in 1981 at a critical moment
in the history of the school, and he arrived with his Sander County ethnog
raphy in tow from the American Bar Foundation, to be met and surrounded
immediately by a sea of law and society and critical legal historian types. But
the school's commitment to law and society and interdisciplinary work had
two separate but related histories, one stemming from a period of time in the
1930s contemporaneous with Llewellyn's attempt to refashion legal education,
and a more immediate one stemming from the decade of the 1970s.
As has been well chronicled, the Buffalo Law School in the late 1930s and
'40s centered, at least initially, on the hiring of Frank Shea as Dean. Shea, a
protege of Felix Frankfurter, was brought in to get the law school accredited,
and one of his many accomplishments (with Frankfurter's assistance) was to
start a pipeline from the Harvard Law School to Buffalo (which often turned
out to go back to Harvard) -a faculty pipeline fueled by the occasional former
Holmes or Brandeis Supreme Court clerk, some of whom brought with them
their interests in law combined with other disciplines, or went on to other
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disciplines themselves. 28 If one thinks of Holmes, the skeptic and pragmatist
("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience"29 ), or
Brandeis and his obsession with facts3° (just substitute context for facts),
one can see that the preconditions were set for viewing law in a more expan
sive way. Some of the scholarship done here at the time grappled with
history, sociology, the development of the administrative state, tax policy,
labor relations- not always the standard fare for legal academics then (though
the Realists were beginning to make inroads into some forms of empirical
social science3').
These traditions were revived in the early 1970s, when the law school had
the temerity to hire as Dean Red Schwartz - a sociologist without a law
degree - and brought to Buffalo some of the most significant figures in the
early history of the formal Law and Society movement and its Association.
Folks like Marc Galanter and Bob Gordon wrote early classics in the genre
while at Buffalo,32 but by 1977 a wholesale exodus had occurred, and Red,
Marc, and Bob - on his way to critical legal studies and a rejection of
functionalism33 - and others had left. A new Dean, Tom Headrick, with a
law degree in addition to a PhD, was in place on a new university campus,
in a new law school building that was no longer located downtown as in
the past. At the dedication of its cornerstone, the school's mission was tied
directly to other university disciplines blessed as the wave and promise of the
future by one of the leading practitioners of one of the leading local law firms,
who observed:
.a Daniel Horowitz, "David Riesman: from law to social criticism," Buffalo Law Review, 58

'9
3o

3'
3'

33

(2010), 1008-<); no author, "A gathering to remember Jacob D. Hyman, Dean and Professor,"
Buffalo Law Review, 57 (2009), 1129-30; Robert Schaus and James Arnone, University at
Buffalo Law School: 100 Years, 1887-1987: A History (University at Buffalo Law Alumni
Association, 1992), pp. fS--9.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1881).
Louis D. Brandeis, "The living law," Illinois Law Review, 10 (1916), 467 ("[N)o law, written or
unwritten, can be understood without a full knowledge of the facts out of which it arises, and to
which it is to be applied"). The ready translation of this insight about law into the iconic
Brandeis Brief goes without saying. See Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (Pantheon
Books, 2009), pp. 212-27, and Lawrence S. Zacharias, "Reframing the Constitution: Brandeis,
"facts," and the nation's deliberative process," The Journal Jurisprudence, 20 (2013), 327.
See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (University of
North Carolina Press, 1995).
'
Marc Galanter, "Why the 'haves' come out ahead: speculations on the limits oflegal change,"
Law 6 Society Review, 9 (1974), 95; Robert W. Gordon, "Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the
common law tradition in American legal historiography," Law 6 Society Review, 10 (1975), 9·
Robert W. Gordon, "Critical legal histories," Stanford Law Review, 36 (1984), 57; John Henry
Schlegel, "Notes toward an intimate, opinionated, and affectionate history of the Conference
on Critical Legal Studies," Stanford Law Review, 36 (1984), 391.
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Professional training alone, however, is not enough. The new law school
must produce graduates who are educated and involved citizens in addition
to being trained professionals. For this purpose the availability of relevant
studies here on the campus must be put to use. Indeed, it is almost certai~
that one can no longer be considered a capable lawyer or public official
unless he has been at least exposed to the greater problems of the world
today, unless he has thought long and deeply about such present concerns as
war and peace, environment, sociological, historical and political problems,
the viability of democracy, culture and the arts, and the place of man in
the universe.H
Armed with a 150-page single-spaced strategic plan,35 along with a fifty-page
mission statement,36 Tom Headrick dedicated his tenure as Dean to the
proposition that Buffalo should not be what was termed a "garden variety"
law school; but instead should be a fully interdisciplinary "Buffalo model" that
stood out for its distinctiveness, an island in a sea of convention. The problem
now, however, was that some of the important contributors to that mission
were gone, and the question was whether that new vision- or, for that matter,
any vision - would long endure.
Intentionally or not, the place was crawling with people with historical
interests of one type or another, though not all were full-time legal historians.
Though that little corner of the world fit comfortably within the law and
society canon, it was somewhat removed from the work of Galanter and others
in the burgeoning law and society movement. And with law school appoint
ments committees' penchant for replicating themselves, it was not exactly
clear--what direction the school would take. Of the thirteen people whom
David thanks in the acknowledgments of "The Oven Bird's Song," six are
from Buffalo, and five of those six had historical interests, or wrote on
historical topics, or were full-time legal historians.37 On the faculty at the time
were about ten or a dozen people who at one point or another wrote on
historical subjects, and a few more would soon join the faculty. This is the

34

35

6
3
37

Manly Fleischmann, Present at the Re·Creation (Remarks ... At the, Cornerstone Ceremonies
of the Law School of the State University of New York at Buffalo, May u, 1971), 12-13
(copy on file with the author).
"Long Range Plan of the Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York
at Buffalo, June, 1975," Box 20, Folder 1, Law Special Collection 02, University at Buffalo
Law School Records, 1898-2oo8, Charles B. Sears Law Library, The State University of
New York at Buffalo.
'"The Buffalo Model' and Mission Statement, 1976--1977," Box 9, Folder 2, ibid.
Engel, "The ovenbird's song," 55:~.,**. The five are James B. Atleson, Guyora Binder, Fred
Konefsky, John Henry Schlegel, and Robert J. Steinfeld. Only Virginia Leary did not write
in the field.
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environment that David joined, and in which substantial cross-fertilization
took place, to the benefit of what might appear at first blush to be different
approaches to sociolegal phenomena. So why was his article found so con
genial here? Or is David's work so ecumenical that it speaks to a whole range
of social science disciplines (in their various empirical configurations) that
inform law and society (anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology,
history, and maybe even law), and that each discipline gets to interpret "The
Oven Bird" in its own image? Is it the case that one of its attractions and
strengths is its accessibility to so many sides of the law and society coin?
John Henry Schlegel (who inhabits the SUNY Buffalo Law School build
ing to this very day, in a kind of epigrammatic Llewellynesque outsized way)
recently proclaimed that "[h ]istorians, at least my kind of historians, like what
Clifford Geertz called 'thick description,"' and that they
have explanations or understandings or interpretations, rather than theories.
They once had causes, but causation has fallen a bit out of style. For histo
rians, things relate, cohere, suggest, lead to; they expose, clarify, elucidate,
inform, reveal, illustrate. Buried by these words is a loss that our language
tries to ignore. Historians really know a lot of things. One should never be
allowed to forget this fact. But for us the difficulty comes, and so the serious
work begins, when one leaves the archives or other sources and so it is time
to say what those things mean. The question of meaning is the heart of
historical practice. 38
Likewise, David is on record, while reflecting on "The OvenBird's Song,"
as having been somewhat influenced by Geertz and "thick description," and
also writing "at a time when interpretive techniques had becom_e more impor
tant for sociolegal researchers."39 And, along the lines of Schlegel's observa
tion, David thought "it seemed much more important to explore questions of
meaning - not only what people did but how they explained and thought
about what they did."40 Though I agree with much of what Schlegel has to
say, I would put it a little differently. I view my function as a historian as
recreating the world as the actors have experienced it (almost by definition
a contextual enterprise) - a kind of, if you will, ethnography of the dead
8
3

39

40

John Henry Schlegel, "Philosophical inquiry and historical practice," Virginia Law Review, 101
(2015), 1198--9. The internal reference to Geertz is, of course, to the classic chapter "Thick
description: toward an interpretive theory of culture," in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of
Cultures 3 (Basic Books, 1973).
"David Engel and 'The OvenBird's Song,"' in Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt (eds.),
Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and Practices (Cambridge
University Press, 2009), pp. 83, 90.
Ibid.
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(without, of course, having to talk to them or interview them, and certainly not
having to be on site with them). To the extent that it involves thick descrip
tion, one can immediately understand why David's work on "The OvenBird's
Song" would appear so interesting, challenging, and captivating to a historian,
and why a natural synergy would seem possible.
A lot has been said and will be said in this volume about what "The Oven
Bird's Song" is about, and I do not want to intrude any more than is necessary
into that part of the conversation. It is a story about law and litigiousness (or
perceptions of litigiousness) in a small, rural community, and the apprehen
sion and antipathy a portion of that community brought to both the specter
and reality of personal injury claims, experiencing the claims as a betrayal of
its core values. Most personal injury litigation (and there was precious little of
it) was viewed as being brought on behalf of newcomers, outsiders who didn't
understand the prevailing cultural attitudes in the place they had recently
come to inhabit. By contrast, contract litigation was not frowned on by the
same community and not seen as a threat to its cultural integrity. David sees
these attitudes as stemming from the substantial social and economic changes
that were underway in Sander County: Attitudes about law were shaped by
social forces and differentially distributed within the community. Formal
dispute-processing was acceptable in some circumstances but not in others,
and that sorting followed from where one stood in the social and economic
structure of the locality. Fears of upheaval and disintegration were displaced
onto those who had recently. joined the community. And the reigning elites
exercised social control by disapproving of or stereotyping those who had been
injured and who might contemplate seeking legal redress. The predominant
culture emphasized that victims of injuries should generally just "lump it" and
move on. Personal injury claims were deemed anti-communal; debt collec
tion cases were not. The result was a series of social classifications that had an
impact on whether legal rights were asserted, and some of the classifications
were readily recognizable in certain corners of the worlds of sociology,
anthropology, history, and political science: insiders and outsiders, inclusion
and exclusion, core and periphery, and haves and have-nots (about which
Llewellyn wrote in The Bramble Bush, by the waf').
I have always seen "The Oven Bird's Song" as a profound essay about
cultural anxiety, which also just happens to be about attitudes about going
to or invoking law. In the process of examining the cultural flux, we learn
about a lot of things, including about law, and particularly its relationship to

4'

Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, 153.
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social context. All that formal and intricate and evolved tort doctrine is of
absolutely no avail if the prevailing cultural practice and pressure counsels
against using it. One might think that one would pursue legal rights and
remedies when a sense of community fractures or breaks down, but that does
not seem to have been the case in Sander County for those who experienced
the sting of exclusion. Talk about legal realism. David mapped how ordinary
people interpreted the social matrix in which they were embedded. On the
one hand, they are endowed with a system of rights for redress of injury
handed down from higher law authorities (courts or administrative bodies or
legislatures) that seemed confident that they had identified and provided for
the solution to social or policy problems. On the other, people may or may not
know of the legal systemic approach to their situations, and even if they do,
they may think, given the complex social environment in which they live, that
it is meaningless (David's search for meaning again), because it does not
represent a meaningful or realistic approach to what ails them. What is
interesting is that the local social elites want the "ordinary people" who have
been injured to ignore what the lawgivers have offered from the top down, and
they have instead inserted their elite ideology on the ground to limit effectively
·or constrain the choices of those most in need.
In reading David, I often wonder what a good old-fashioned neo-Marxist
would think of all of this. What would E. P. Thompson have looked for in
interrogating class, and gender, ethnicity, and race?""' Where do these attitudes
come from and how are they formed? One of the troubling implications of
David's portrait of Sander County is its import for what we might traditionally
describe as the literature on the rule of law.43 The threat to the rule oflaw in
democracies is often conceived of as emanating from the abuse of formal,
governmental or state power - flaunting traditional understandings, violating
rules, engaging in inappropriate exercises of discretion. But David's work may
reveal the soft underbelly of the rule of law in a democracy, that is, the extent
to which ordinary people are meant to feel or experience in their communities

40
4~

E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Vintage Books, 1963).
For a good introduction to the complexity of debates about the rule oflaw in twentieth-century
American legal history, see chapter 8, "Legal realism, the bureaucratic state, and the rule of
law" in Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation ofAmerican Law, I87o-196o: The Crisis of
Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford University Press, 1992.), pp. 213-46, as well as Sanford Levinson and
Jack M. Balkin, "Morton Horwitz wrestlt:5 with the rule of law" in Daniel W. Hamilton and
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that the rules or laws are not really available to them, that there is danger in
vindicating their rights because the social contl'!xt in which they live disap
proves of legally constituted regimes of protection and social responsibility,
legal protections ostensibly provided by the democratic state. (It is a little
reminiscent of the role of private actors in the Reconstruction South, in
collaboration, of course, with state actors and courts.#) The handful oflawyers
we encounter in Sander County seem somewhat uncomfortable in their role
in the system of dispute processing, even those who approve, of deterring
people from claiming or suing.45 'We have met the enemy and he is us." 46
We cannot begin to grasp that possibility of the subtle subversion of the rule of
law unless we start to unpack the deep insights ii?-to the relationship between
legal culture and social culture that David has provided.
I want to end where I began, by returning to Karl Llewellyn's vision of a
law school (which includes legal scholarship) and tying it to David's work in
"The Oven Bird's Song" and elsewhere, and to the revival of law and society
here at Buffalo after the departure of some of its standard-bearers. It seems
quite clear that "The Oven Bird's Song" is a pretty close embodiment of the
model set out in Llewellyn's call for reformation of legal education. From
the idea that "[b )y and large the basic order in our society ... is not produced
by law"47 (a pretty fair conclusion to draw from Sander County, though "basic
order" ironically may have something to do with the reaction to law), to the
assertion that the academic discipline of law must remain a steward of the
concept of justice, to the insistence that law belongs in the humanities as well
as aspiring to be humane, to the argument that the best and most useful
method for legal education in making a continuing social contribution to
the larger culture and the greater good is to provide an understanding of
background, facts, and context (with its multiplicity of definitions and mean
ing), to the use of interdisciplinary approaches- all these measures seem to be
hallmarks of "The Oven Bird's Song." It is humane in its treatment of the
"ordinary people" who live in its pages; it raises questions about the justness
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of a system - social or legal or economic - that turns its back on the people
who are injured as that system continues to function; it movingly catalogs the
fate or plight of those considered to be outside the mainsprings of power and
influence; it brings up questions about the efficacy of law itself (what is a
lawyer supposed to do when faced with the knowledge of how the community
operates?); and, though it is careful not to judge and treats all its ethnographic
encounters with tact and delicacy (it is David, after all), it is also a moral
argument challenging the effectiveness of law in society - and ultimately, in
Llewellyn's sense, it teaches or educates. It is quite an accomplishment, which
was shared with pride in the institution at which it was finally written. And
ultimately, it asked in a law and society sense not just whether law matters, but
rather of what matter law is made. Llewellyn would have approved.

